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Proskauer, J., in the present case, declined to follow those cases, on the
ground that the Uniform Act had changed the New York law of fix-
tures.
Kohler Co. v. Brasum,82 gives some attention to the section on fix-
tures under their present laws,"3 though not resting the decision upon
this provision. Nothing unexpressed in the two above cases is men-
tioned. 34
These three cases, which are probably examples of what may be ex-
pected in the future, clearly reveal the beneficial effect of the adoption
of Section 7 of the Uniform Act in outlining an adequate and practical
method of adjusting the conflicting rights of conditional sellers of chat-
tels to become annexed to the realty and subsequent purchasers of the
realty. This provision is without a doubt one of the finest recent devel-
opments in the law of sales, and its adoption should be heartily endorsed
everywhere.
D. A. MACPHERSON, JR., '29.
226 N. Y. S. (60) (Dec., 1927).
'Supra, note 25.
"For a full discussion of the Kohler case and the Cohen case, see CornellLaw Quarterly, 13:435-8.
REMOVABILITY WHERE RESIDENT CO-DEFENDANT IS
NOT SERVED
In Rodgers v. Gaines Bros. Co.' a resident of Missouri brought an
action for personal injuries in the state court, alleged to have been
caused by the joint negligence of the defendant corporation, organized
in Oklahoma, and the defendant foreman, a citizen of Missouri. The
corporation was alleged to have furnished an unsafe wagon and the
foreman was alleged to have directed the plaintiff to drive it in a dan-
gerous place. The resident foreman was not served with summons.
The defendant corporation filed a petition for removal to the federal
court, on the ground of diversity of citizenship. The petition was de-
nied, and the defendant excepted. During the taking of the defendant's
evidence, the plaintiff dismissed as to the resident foreman. It was
held that the petition for removal had been properly denied.
The time when a cause of action such as the one in the principal case
becomes removable is a question which the courts have fairly definitely
settled, but one which is still likely to trip up the unwary lawyer.2 It
is the purpose of this note to state the rules which the courts have
formulated.
1295 S. W. 492 (Mo. App.).
2 Of course, in many cases in which it appears that the lawyers had been
caught asleep it is possible that they had had no serious desire to remove the
cause; that the point had originally been raised solely for the purpose of delay;
and that they paid no more than slight attention to it until after the case had
been lost in the trial court.
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Where the state law permits a master and servant to be sued jointly
for injuries caused by the latter's negligence, the plaintiff has the legal
right to treat the cause as a joint one,3 whatever his motive is in so do-
ing.' The liability is joint and several, and a defendant is not to be
heard to say that the plaintiff must treat the defendants as severally
liable in order to facilitate the removal of the cause. Still more estab-
lished is the rule that where the plaintiff alleges in his petition (as in the
principal case) that the negligence of the master and servant concurred
in producing the injury, though they might be separately sued, the plain-
tiff has the right to sue them jointly.
In Cincinnati N. 0. & T. P. R. Co. v. Balon,5 a resident of Kentucky
brought suit against a nonresident railroad company and its resident
engineer for injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of
both defendants (although in reality it was the negligence of the
servant, for which the master was liable on the doctrine of respondeat
superior). The court denied the petition of the railroad company for
removal, saying: "Where [a state] has provided that the plaintiff in
such cases may proceed jointly or severally against those liable for the
injury and the plaintiff, in due course of law and in good faith, has
filed a petition electing to sue for a joint recovery given by the laws of
the state, we know nothing in the federal removal statute which will
convert such action into a separable controversy for the purpose of re-
moval, because of the presence of a nonresident therein, properlyjoined under the Constitution and laws of that state wherein it is con-
ducting its operations, and is duly served with process."
The principle that "a defendant has no right to say that an action
shall be several which the plaintiff seeks to make joint" is the clue to
the problem raised by the principal case. Its importance is due to the
fact that in such cases the cause cannot be removed to the federal court
on the ground of diversity of citizenship unless all the defendants join
in the petition for removal and are all nonresidents.7 Hence, in every
*Alabama G. S. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U. S. 206, 50 L. Ed. 441, 26 Sup.
Ct. 161.
'The fact that the plaintiff's motive in the joinder was to prevent a removal
of the cause by the nonresident defendant does not affect the right to removal.
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Schwyhart, 227 U. S. 184, 57 L. Ed. 473, 33 Sup. Ct.
250, and the numerous cases cited in note 362 to Sec. 71, Title 28, U. S. C. A.
That the resident defendant is pecuniarily irresponsible does not show a fraudu-
lent joinder to prevent removal. Dowell v. Chicago, R. 1. & P. R. Co., 83 Kan.
562, 112 Pac. 136, affirmed 229 U. S. 102, 57 L. Ed. 1090, 33 Sup. Ct. 584.
1200 U. S. 221, 50 L. Ed. 448, 26 Sup. Ct. 166.
'Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 169 U. S. 92, 42 L. Ed. 673, 18 Sup. Ct.
264.
' Chicago, R. I. & P. R. v. Martin, 178 U. S. 245, 44 L. Ed. 1055, 20 Sup. Ct. 854;
Highway Const. Co. v. McClelland, 14 Fed. (2d) 406. There is a line of cases
apparently inconsistent, in which one defendant was not served with process,
and yet the other defendant was granted removal; but in these cases all the
defendants were nonresidents. Tremper v. Schwabacher, 84 Fed. 413; Keenan
v. Gladys Belle Oil Co., 11 Fed. (2d) 418; Bowles v. H. J. Heinz Co., 188 Fed.
937; Hunt v. Pearce, 271 Fed. 498; and Community Bldg. Co. v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 8 Fed. (2d) 678. In the last cited case, the court said: "While
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such case, the inquiry is: Is a resident defendant a party to the action?
Much depends upon the statutes of the particular state involved, but in
general it may be said that one is a party defendant from the moment
the plaintiff commences his action against him by filing his petition,
"irrespective of the service of the writ of summons upon him."s When
one realizes that the service of summons has no bearing upon the ques-
tion of removal, up to the moment of trial, the problem is much
simplified.
It is obvious that when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action
as to the resident defendant, that defendant is no longer a party to the
cause; and this is true whether or not he has been served. There would
be no doubt that the cause would thus become immediately removable
were it not for the words of the present federal removal statute:
Any party entitled to remove any suit .. .may make and file a
petition [for removal] at the time, or any time before the defend-
ant is required .. . to answer or plead to the declaration or com-
plaint of the plaintiff. 9
When the case stated in the plaintiff's petition is a removable one, the
defendant should file his petition for removal at or before the time he
is required to make any defense whatever, in accordance with the plain
meaning of the statute.Y0 "But it by no means follows, when the case
does not become in its nature a removable one until after the time men-
tioned in the act has expired, that it cannot be removed at all."'" To so
hold would work an unnecessary injustice. Besides, the statute reads
"a party entitled to remove." As long as the resident defendant is a
party to the action, the nonresident defendant is not entitled to remove
the cause, and hence cannot successfully file a petition for removal.
Therefore, since cases becoming removable after the defendant has
pleaded to the complaint or declaration were not expressly provided for
in the statute, the courts have engrafted on the statute rules to fit the
circumstances, rules which as nearly as possible are within the spirit of
the removal act.
In Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co.,1la three resident employees
were joined with the nonresident railroad company. There was, service
on the railroad company and on two resident defendants, but none on
there are some early decisions and expressions in the textbooks to the effect
that all the defendants, whether or not they have been served and brought
within the jurisdiction of the court, must join in the petition for removal, the
weight of authority, and we think the better reasoning, sustains the rule thatdefendants over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction may be disre-
garded in removal proceedings, and that the defendants who have been sum-
moned must of necessity be allowed to exercise their right of removal."
'Rodgers v. Gaines Bros. Co., 295 S. W. 492 (Mo.).
'Judicial Code Sec. 72, Title 28.
" Edrington v. Jefferson, 111 U. S. 770, 28 L. Ed. 594, 4 Sup. Ct. 683.
"Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 169 U. S. 92, 42 L. Ed. 673, 18 Sup. Ct.
264.
"aSupra, note 11.
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the third resident defendant. A petition for removal was filed, which
was denied, and the case was also remanded by the federal court. Then
the railroad company answered. A year after the first petition for re-
moval, and when the case was called for trial before a jury in the state
court, the plaintiff discontinued the action against the individual de-
fendants. The railroad company filed a second petition for removal.
It was held that a petition for removal filed as soon as the case becomes
a removable one is filed in time, although it is after the time when the
defendant is required to answer. The court said, per Justice Gray:
"To construe that provision as restricting to the time prescribed for
answering the declaration the removal of a case which is not a remov-
able one at that time, would not only be inconsistent with the words of
the statute, but it would utterly defeat all right of removal in many
cases .. .The reasonable construction of the act of Congress, and the
only one which will prevent the right of removal, to which the statute
declares the party to be entitled, from being defeated by circumstances
wholly beyond his control, is to hold that the incidental provision as to
time, must when necessary to carry out the purpose of the statute yield
to the principal enactment as to the right; and to consider the statute
as, in intention and effect, permitting and requiring the defendant to
file a petition for removal as soon as the action assumes the shape of a
removal case in the court in which it is brought."
Powers v. Railway Company is the leading case on this problem, and
ever since it was decided the courts have uniformly held that a voluntary
dismissal as to a resident defendant gives the nonresident defendant a
right to file a petition for removal at once. It is only when the cases
diverge slightly from a dismissal which is voluntary one pure and sim-
ple that new battlegrounds arise. Suppose, for example, that the resi-
dent defendant has not been served, but the plaintiff proceeds to trial
against the nonresident defendant alone. Is the former still a party
to the action, so that the cause cannot be removed?
In Berry v. Railway Company,'2 the plaintiff sued two railroads who
were jointly and severally liable for the death of plaintiff's intestate.
One defendant was a resident and one was a nonresident. No process
was served on the resident defendant. When the case was called for
trial, the nonresident appeared and moved that the plaintiff be required
to elect whether she would dismiss as to the resident defendant or con-
tinue the cause for service. The plaintiff declined to do either, but re-
quested that the cause proceed to trial as to the nonresident defendant,
whereupon the latter filed a petition for removal. It was held that the
plaintiff's election to proceed to trial against the nonresident defendant
alone operated as a severance of the controversy and entitled the non-
resident railroad company to remove the cause. The court commented
on various cases, including the Powers case, and said: "It is but
a step further, and it seems a logical one, that if a plaintiff volun-
tarily abandons the joint character of his proceedings and elects to
pursue the only defendant who has been drawn within the jurisdiction
2 118 Fed. 911.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol13/iss4/5
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of the court upon a liability which is either joint or several, at his elec-
tion, there arises at the moment of the election such a change in the
structure of the controversy as confines the inquiry to the citizenship
of the parties then before the court."
Another case to the same effect is Golden v. Northern Pacific R. Co.13
Here the resident defendant who had not been served and had not made
an appearance, was actually present at the trial as a witness. No ques-
tion arose at the time the plaintiff announced he was ready for trial;
but the court held that the announcement by the plaintiff that he was
ready for trial, the nonresident defendant knowing that the resident
was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court, amounted to notice to
the nonresident that the plaintiff had determined to proceed against him
alone, thus converting the action into a several one against the nonresi-
dent "as effectively as if it had originally been made the sole defendant."
In this connection, Section 1406 R. S. Mo. 1919 is relevant. It
provides that where there are several defendants, some of whom do not
appear and are neither notified nor summoned, the plaintiff may pro-
ceed against those, if any, who do appear or are summoned, and dismiss
his petition as to the others; or he may continue the cause until the
next ferm. As the principal case points out, "the clear import of this
statute is that, after an action has been duly commenced against a party
defendant, he is a party to the action, even though not served," but
ceases to be a party when the plaintiff evidences his intention of aban-
doning the cause of action against him by electing to proceed to trial
without him, or by voluntarily dismissing as to him.
A line of cases diverging still farther from the Powers case is those
in which the cause of action against the resident defendant is dismissed
or is shown to be nonexistent in some other manner than through the
agency of the plaintiff. Of course, in these cases the defendant has
been served. It appears to be definitely established that where the
plaintiff has not acquiesced in such action and still regards the resident
as a party, the nonresident defendant is not entitled to remove the cause.
In American Car Co. v. Kettelhake,1" a demurrer by the resident de-
fendant was sustained, the plaintiff excepting, and saving his exception.
The plaintiff then asked to take involuntary nonsuit, with leave to set
it aside, which request was granted. It was held that the nonresident
defendant could not remove the cause. The court said: "Where
there is a joint cause of action against defendants residents of the
same state with the plaintiff and a nonresident defendant, it must
appear to make the case a removable one as to a nonresident defendant
because of dismissal as to resident defendants that the discontinuance
as to such defendants was voluntary on the part of the plaintiff, and
that such action has taken the resident defendants out of the case, so
as to leave a controversy wholly between the plaintiff the plaintiff and
the nonresident defendant." In other words, the resident defendants
must have completely disappeared from the case; and as long as the
39 Mont. 435, 104 Pac. 549, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1154.
236 U. S. 311, 59 L. Ed. 594, 35 Sup. Ct. 355.
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plaintiff has the right to have the ruling reviewed by the appellate
court, the resident defendant remains a party to the action.
In Southern R. Co. v. Lloyd,15 two railroads, lessor and lessee, were
sued jointly in North Carolina for negligence. One of the defendants
was a Virginia corporation and the other was organized in North Caro-
lina. A petition for removal on the ground of diversity of citizenship
was denied. At the close of the plaintiff's testimony the court inti-
mated that there was no cause of action against the North Carolina
railroad, and upon this intimation a nonsuit was taken as to that com-
pany. A second petition for removal was then filed, which was de-
nied, the court saying: "The order of nonsuit in the trial court as to
the North Carolina Railroad Company, appealed from by the plaintiff
with the right of review in the Supreme Court of the state, did not make
the cause removable as to the Southern Railway Company."
And in Alabama, Great Southern R. Co. v. Thompson,0 it was said:
"The right to remove depended upon the case made in the complaint
against both defendants jointly, and that right in absence of a showing
of fraudulent joinder, did not arise from the failure of the complainant
to establish a joint cause of action.' 17
At first blush, it seems that the courts have set up an artificial dis-
tinction between voluntary and involuntary dismissals; but there is al-
ways the possibility that the trial court erred in its ruling, and until
that point is definitely settled, it cannot be said that the resident defend-
ant is no longer a party to the action. Hence, until a final ruling, the
plaintiff can continue to regard the cause as a joint one.
The importance of the foregoing rules, as a practical matter, lies in
the indication of the time when the petition for removal should be filed.
If at the time the petition for removal is filed the cause is not remov-
able, the petition will not succeed, no matter what happens afterwards,
"239 U. S. 496, 60 L. Ed. 402, 36 Sup. Ct. 210.
"200 U. S. 206, 50 L. Ed. 441, 26 Sup. Ct. 161.
"And see Moeller v. Southern Pac. Co. et al., 211 Fed. 239; and Bailey v.
Southern R. Co., 112 So. 203 (M 27). Whitcomb v. Smithson, 175 U. S. 635
was an action against two railroads jointly. The court granted a motion to
instruct the jury to return a verdict in behalf of one railroad. The other de-
fendant immediately filed a petition for removal; this was denied, the court
saying, "the contention here is that when the trial court determined to direct a
verdict in favor of the Chicago Great Western Railway Company, the result
was that the case stood as if the receivers had been sole defendants, and that
they then acquired a right of removal which was not concluded by the pre-
vious action of the Circuit Court (denying an earlier petition for removal).
This might have been so if when the cause was called for trial in the state
court plaintiff had discontinued his action against the railway company, and
thereby elected to prosecute it against the receivers solely, instead of prose-
cuting it on the joint cause of action set up in the complaint against all defend-
ants (citing the Powers case). But that is not the case. The joint liability
was insisted on here to the close of the trial, and the non-liability of the railway
company was ruled in invitum .... This was a ruling on the merits, and
not a ruling on the question of jurisdiction. It was adverse to plaintiff, and
without his assent .... The right to remove was not contingent on the as-
pect the case may have assumed on the facts developed on the merits of the
issues tried."
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol13/iss4/5
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and the appellate court, like the trial court, will consider the applica-
tion as of the time it was filed.- .
In Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Wangelin'9 (a case involving a
separable controversy, but the principle of which is applicable) the court
said: "The question whether there is a separable controversy which will
warrant a removal is to be determined by the condition of the record
in the state court at the time of the filing of the petition for removal."20
In the principal case, the court held that the resident defendant was
a party to the action, although not served; hence, a petition for removal
then filed was of necessity denied. When the plaintiff elected to pro-
ceed to trial against the nonresident alone, the case became removable,
but the defendant waived his right of removal by not filing a new peti-
tion at once. The court stated the rule concisely, as follows: "The
right of appellant to have removed this case must be determined as of
the time of the filing of its petition therefor."20
The rule of the principal case is well stated in the syllabus to Mor-
gan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Street21 in the following words: "A
nonresident defendant who failed to request the court to suspend the
trial to enable him to prepare a bond and application for removal of
the action to the federal court on the dismissal of the action as to the
resident defendant, but who continued in the trial, and took chances
with the jury, waived his right of removal to the federal court."
Assuming, then, that a right to remove arises after answer has been
made and that a new petition for removal must be filed, what is the
time within which it must be filed? It was said earlier in this note
that no express provision covers this point; but Powers v. Railroad Co.,
supra, intimated that it should be filed as soon as the cause becomes re-
movable. Although the question does not often arise, the better doctrine
appears to be to construe this strictly, and to narrow the time limit as
much as possible.
In Fogarty v. Southern Pacific Co. et al.,22 the federal court was very
liberal. The plaintiff, having given notice that he would appear on
Feb. 7, 1903, to move that the case be set for trial, the plaintiff ap-
peared, and moved the court dismiss as against the resident defendant.
This was done, and entered in the minutes, and the case was set for
March 9. Defendant was unrepresented on that occasion and was not
given actual notice of the dismissal. On Feb. 13, the defendant's at-
torney made a verbal request of the plaintiff's attorney for a change in
the time fixed for trial, which request was not acceded to. Thereafter,
a, "It will be perceived that in Powers v. Railway Company, supra, two applica-
tions for removal were made; they were severally denied, and the record was
filed in the Circuit Court of the United States in each instance. Remand was
granted on the first removal and denied as to the second. Plaintiff volun-
tarily discontinued his action against the co-defendants before (the second peti-
tion was filed) leaving the case pending between citizens of different states."
K. C. Sub. Belt R. Co. v. Herman, 187 U. S. 63, 47 L. Ed. 76, 23 Sup. Ct. 24.
132 U. S. 599, 33 L. Ed. 473, 10 Sup. Ct. 203.
o Italics ours.
'57 Tex. Civ. App. 194, 122 S. W. 270. The syllabus paragraph is from the
report in the Southwestern Reporter. ' 121 Fed. 941.
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nineteen days subsequent to the dismissal, the defendant filed a peti-
tion for removal. It did not appear when actual knowledge of such
dismissal was first acquired. The court granted the petition, saying,
"Nor, from the facts appearing, can it be properly held that the appli-
cation for removal of the action was not made by the defendant com-
pany within a reasonable time after its right of removal arose.
'23
The strict view is taken in Golden v. Northern Pacific R. Co.2 4 The
petition for removal was filed on the second day of the trial, at the
close of the plaintiff's evidence in chief. It was held that the petition
came too late.25 The case is interesting as illustrating an attempt made
by the defendant's attorney to conceal his negligence in failing to ap-
ply for removal in time. Before filing the petition, the attorney stated
to the court that the resident defendant was then in court and could
be served and asked whether it was the intent of the plaintiff's coun-
sel to serve him and have the action proceed against both defendants
jointly. The plaintiff's counsel said they intended to have service at
their own pleasure. Then the petition was filed, on the theory that
the plaintiff had then elected to sever the action. But the court held
that the case had become removable when the plaintiff elected to pro-
ceed against the nonresident defendant alone who had been served;
and no petition having been filed, the point was waived.
The cases may be distinguished on their facts, since in the Fogarty
case, the cause had not yet come up for trial. Whether this is a dis-
tinction the Supreme Court will recognize remains to be seen, but
the clear import of the Supreme Court cases is in favor of the Golden
case.28 It would seem that if a choice must be made, the Golden case
is the better of the two. The courts permit the application to be filed,
not on the authority of any specific statutory mandate, but on grounds of
fairness, which would also require that this privilege be exercised
as soon as possible.
The following rules appear as the result of this inquiry:
(1) Where the plaintiff's petition states a joint cause of action
against a resident and a nonresident defendant, and there is no separ-
able controversy, the cause is not removable; (2) But if the plaintiff
voluntary dismisses as against the resident defendant or elects to pro-
ceed to trial without him, the cause becomes immediately removable;
(3) A petition filed before that time will not be considered, even though
the cause has since become removable; a petition for removal, in order
to succeed, must be filed after the cause becomes removable; (4) And
this petition must be filed as soon as the circumstances of the case
permit. 
JOSEPH NESSENFELD, '29.
" This case was approved and followed in Markey v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.
Co., 171 Ia. 255, 153 N. W. 1053, where the application for removal was filed
thirteen days after the dismissal.
'Note 13, supra.
"And see Aetna Indemnity Co. v. City of Little Rock, 115 S. W. 960, where
the petition for removal was filed after judgment, nine days after the dismissal.
" Remington v. Central Pac. R. Co., 198 U. S. 95, 49 L. Ed. 959, 25 Sup. Ct.
577; Fritzlen v. Boatmen's Bank, 212 U. S. 364, 53 L. Ed. 551, 29 Sup. Ct. 366.
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